3. Protect Backup Systems From Attackers

Having backups does not automatically mean an organization can recover.

Attackers frequently search for backup systems after entering a network. They may delete backup files, compromise backup administrator accounts, change retention settings, or wait until infected data has been copied into the backup environment.

A stronger backup strategy should include:

• Multiple copies of important information
• At least one offline or isolated copy
• Separate backup administrator credentials
• Multi-factor authentication
• Encryption
• Immutable storage where appropriate
• Defined retention periods
• Regular restoration testing
• Monitoring for unusual backup changes
• Clear recovery priorities

The backup environment should not rely on the same identity system and administrator credentials as the production environment.

Most importantly, organizations should test complete recovery rather than simply confirming that backup files exist. A successful test should prove that applications, data, permissions, and dependent services can be restored within the required time.

CISA’s ransomware guidance also emphasizes maintaining offline or protected backups and regularly exercising restoration procedures.

4. Patch Internet-Facing Systems First

Unpatched systems can provide attackers with a direct route into the organization.

Your vulnerability-management process should prioritize:

• Virtual private network systems
• Firewalls
• Remote desktop services
• Web applications
• Email servers
• Cloud platforms
• File-transfer applications
• Identity services
• Public APIs
• Unsupported software

Not every vulnerability carries equal business risk. A critical weakness on an isolated test device may be less urgent than a medium-rated weakness on an internet-facing system connected to sensitive data.

Prioritization should consider:

• Whether the vulnerability is being actively exploited
• Whether the asset is publicly accessible
• Whether authentication is required
• What privileges an attacker could obtain
• Which data or operations are exposed
• Whether other security controls reduce the risk

CyberHelm’s Cyber Solutions support wider visibility into external exposures, threat intelligence, compromised data, and digital risks that may not appear in a traditional internal scan.

5. Monitor for Early Ransomware Warning Signs

Ransomware encryption may be the final stage of an attack rather than the beginning.

Before files are encrypted, attackers may spend time:

• Stealing login details
• Creating new accounts
• Increasing account privileges
• Disabling security tools
• Exploring file servers
• Moving between systems
• Accessing backup platforms
• Downloading sensitive information
• Installing remote-access tools
• Communicating with malicious infrastructure

Security monitoring should therefore look for changes in behaviour, not only known ransomware files.

Useful warning signs include:

• Unusual administrative activity
• Large numbers of failed login attempts
• Access from unexpected locations
• Security tools being disabled
• New scheduled tasks
• Unapproved software
• Sudden archive creation
• Large outbound data transfers
• Changes to backup settings
• Mass file modifications

CyberHelm’s Defensive Security services combine monitoring, threat hunting, investigation, telemetry analysis, and response support to help identify suspicious behaviour before it becomes a widespread incident.

6. Monitor for Exposed Credentials

An organization may secure its internal network while employee credentials are already available to criminals.

Credentials can be exposed through:

• Previous data breaches
• Phishing pages
• Information-stealing malware
• Reused passwords
• Compromised personal devices
• Third-party incidents
• Public data dumps
• Criminal marketplaces

Monitoring for leaked credentials gives organizations an opportunity to reset passwords, revoke active sessions, investigate affected accounts, and strengthen access controls before the information is used.

Dark Web Monitoring can provide early visibility into leaked corporate accounts, stolen customer information, brand impersonation, and threat activity connected to an organization.

Dark-web findings should never remain as reports only. Each alert needs an assigned owner, defined severity level, response deadline, and investigation procedure.

7. Create a Ransomware Incident-Response Playbook

A general incident-response document may not provide enough direction during a ransomware emergency.

Create a dedicated ransomware playbook that defines:

• Who can declare an incident
• Who leads the technical response
• Who can isolate systems
• Who contacts executive leadership
• Who manages legal and regulatory requirements
• Who contacts the cyber-insurance provider
• Who communicates with customers and employees
• Who engages external incident-response specialists
• Who approves recovery decisions
• How important evidence will be protected

The playbook should include specific instructions for:

• Isolating infected devices
• Disabling compromised accounts
• Preserving logs and system images
• Protecting unaffected backups
• Identifying affected systems
• Assessing possible data theft
• Prioritizing business recovery
• Communicating through secure channels

CISA recommends following an approved incident-response plan, identifying affected systems, isolating them quickly, keeping leadership informed, and restoring from protected backups in a controlled order.